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Recourse Claims between Carriers – another obstacle to intermodality? 
 
Dr. Simone Lamont-Black* 
 
Abstract: 
The applicable legal regime for recourse and contribution claims between carriers is far from 
straightforward. It entails a mix of contract terms, domestic law and mandatory carriage 
convention provisions, accordingly resulting in a complex mixture of provisions and, in particular, 
of limitation rules. An example of their interaction is given by the English Court of Appeal in South 
West SHA v Bay Island Voyages where the court had to decide on limitation of a contribution 
claim for an incident falling under the Athens Convention for the carriage of passengers and their 
luggage by sea. The case illustrates the critical interaction between convention rules and domestic 
law, which may differ in each case, depending on the applicable convention regime. The result is a 
complicated web of provisions and hierarchies offering a multitude of pitfalls for freight 
forwarders and carriers alike. This effect is showcased more broadly under English law where the 
domestic contribution act and the convention regimes as implemented in the different 
jurisdictions within the UK provide for an uneasy relationship. After detailed analysis of the 
current framework, which is argued to be inadequate, reform suggestions to implementing 
legislation of these international instruments are made, in order to limit the uncertainty created 
by their interaction with the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act, which purports to supersede any 
other rules providing for contribution.    
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many carriage or freight forwarding contracts are not (fully) performed by the contracting party and 
other persons and carriers may transport the goods or be involved at some stage. Where loss occurs 
there are likely to be several parties potentially liable to the cargo claimant, whether in contract, 
tort, bailment or otherwise. If one of the liable parties compensates the claimant, he will want to be 
able to take recourse from the others involved or from the person who had caused the damage. 
Most international carriage conventions provide some rules on recourse rights between carriers or 
on interaction of their liability where several carriers are involved in the transportation. Contractual 
provisions between carriers and performing parties may contain indemnity or contribution clauses 
and English domestic law, particularly in the form of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 
determines contribution and apportionment of liability between several persons liable in respect of 
the same damage. How these regimes interact differs according to the convention applicable in its 
reach of provisions on multiple carriers, whether it leaves scope for domestic law on contribution 
and reimbursement to be applied and how the convention is implemented into the national legal 
framework. As will be seen, even where the convention purports not to regulate recourse claims, 
convention rules on limitation of time for suit may still impinge on contribution claims1 under English 
                                                          
* Assessorin iur. (=1st and 2nd State Examination in Law in Germany), Dr (iur.), Lecturer in International Trade Law at the 
University of Edinburgh. This article is based on a conference paper presented at the Edinburgh Conference on Current 
Issues in Freight Forwarding: Law and Logistics on 3-4th September 2015. My gratitude goes to my colleagues at the 
conference for their feedback and comments, and in particular to Associate Professor Johan Schelin, Stockholm University 
and Mr Robert Howie QC, Ampersand, Edinburgh. Any mistakes that may have found their way into the work are obviously 
my own. 
1 A claim for contribution means a claim by a person (the contribution claimant) to recover from another (the contribution 
defendant) all or part of the amount for which the contribution claimant has become liable to a third party (the original 
claimant or claimant in the claim underlying the contribution claim). A claim for indemnity however would premise that 
recovery is sought for the full amount. (See the wording used Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 s2(3) “…, or to direct 
that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity.”, Glossary to the Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 and see also Takahashi, Claims for Contribution and Reimbursement in an International Context; 
Conflict-of-Laws Dimensions of Third Party Procedure, (Oxford, 2000) (hereafter Takahashi) pp 3-4 and Mitchell, The Law of 
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law. The chapter examines a number of uncertainties within the interaction of the regimes and 
concludes that this is another area where the multiplicity of convention regimes, their lack of 
harmonisation and uncoordinated implementation into domestic law may cause difficulties to 
carriers and freight forwarders who have to apply this multitude, heeding the crucial differences, or 
lose their right of recourse.  
 
To set the scene this chapter firstly gives a short introduction to the English law of contribution and 
reimbursement and illustrates the interaction of the relevant Act with carriage conventions on the 
basis of a recent case in the context of the Athens Convention on the carriage of passengers2. 
Thereafter a brief overview over the various cargo transport convention’s provisions on recourse 
claims and multiple carrier rules is provided before engaging in a deeper examination of these rules 
with an analysis of their, at times, fraught interaction with the relevant domestic law in form of the 
English Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.  As a result and in conclusion, reform suggestions are 
made to implementing legislation of the various international carriage instruments to facilitate the 
conventions’ smooth application in this context. 
 
 
2. The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 
 
English law of contribution and reimbursement is currently in a fragmented state and regulated at 
common law, in equity and in parts nowadays also by statute.3 The key statute on contribution and 
recourse is the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.4 Despite the seemingly narrow name, the Act 
allows for recovery of any amount between a contribution of only a part up to a full indemnity, i.e. a 
100% contribution.5  As the Act may impact on recourse claims between carriers it warrants a short 
introduction and discussion before setting it into context with the pertinent implementations of 
international carriage instruments.  
 
The 1978 Act was to make new provision for contribution between persons who are jointly or 
severally, or both jointly and severally, liable for the same damage, and in certain other similar cases 
where two or more persons have paid or may be required to pay compensation for the same 
damage.6 It was to ensure that the contribution defendant would not be unjustly enriched where the 
defendant’s liability to a third party had been discharged by a claimant who had been liable to the 
same third party.7 The Act was however not intended to interfere with existing rights of indemnity or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Contribution and Reimbursement (Oxford, 2003) (hereafter Mitchell), para 1.14. A claim for contribution is often called a 
claim for reimbursement when made pursuant to a contract; however since such a claim is usually for full recovery the 
term contribution is seldom found in this context (Takahashi p.4). In this chapter the meaning of claim for recourse or 
reimbursement is not strictly restricted to being founded on a contractual basis only. 
2 The Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (Athens) 1974 (Athens Convention) 
3 See Mitchell para 1.18ff., Bugden, Lamont-Black, Goods in Transit (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) (hereafter Bugden)  
ch.11 on Restitution. For a discussion of the legal basis of claims for contribution from a domestic and international 
viewpoint, see Takahashi pp.7 ff. He categorises them as: a) contractual claims for contribution pursuant to an undertaking 
to reimburse the claimant, b) restitutionary claims for contribution, c) statutory claims for contribution (including those 
under the Contribution Act), d) claims for contribution by way of subrogation, e) claims for contribution by way of a claim 
for compensation for the damage suffered in the form of payment made to another, whether in tort or contract, and f) in 
civil law claims for contribution in negotiorum gestio.  
4 For a general introduction of the Act see also Dugdale, “Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978”, (1979) 42 MLR 182, 
Mitchell para 4.20 ff., Bugden paras 11-013 ff. and Halsbury’s Laws of England, Damages (Vol 29 (2014)), Contribution 
between Wrongdoers, paras 620 ff., Halsbury's Laws of England/Restitution (Vol 88 (2012)) Discharge of Debts, paras 481-3 
and Halsbury's Laws of England, Tort (Vol 97 (2015)), The General Law of Tort, Joint and Several Tortfeasors, paras 450 ff. 
5 See Mitchell, para 4.37 n.128 quoting Lord Scarman in Hansard, HL (series 5) vol 395, col 247 (18 July 1978). 
6 Royal Brompton NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] UKHL 14; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1397 at [37] Lord Hope. 
7 See Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48; [2003] 2 A.C. 366 at [76], Lord Hobhouse and Bugden paras 11-011 
ff. The statute creates a cause of action in its own right; see Halsbury’s Law of England, Damages (Vol 29 (2014) 
Contribution between Wrongdoers, para 620, no.8.  
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the law of contribution relating to joint liability in debt, but to cover only joint liability for (the same) 
damage.8  
 
Thus, under section 1 of the Contribution Act “any person liable in respect of any damage suffered 
by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same 
damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise).” The right to contribution applies even where the 
other person's liability arises from a different cause of action.9 This was an extension of the Act 
beyond the former and superseded Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935, which 
only gave a right to contribution between persons who were liable for the same damage in tort.  
While liability has to be for the same damage and not merely substantially for materially similar 
damage10, it seems that it does not have to be founded merely on wrongdoing alone, so that a claim 
for restitution and one for damages could give rise to compensation within section 1 of the 
Contribution Act, although this is not undisputed.11  
In principle, a person is liable to make contribution only if and to the extent that he was liable to the 
person who suffered the damage, although there are several points to consider:12  
The Act stipulates that a judgment given in any action brought in any part of the UK by or on behalf 
of the person who suffered the damage in question against any person from whom contribution is 
sought under section 1 of the Act shall be conclusive in the proceedings for contribution as to the 
any issue determined by that judgment in favour of the person from whom the contribution is 
sought.13 Further, contribution can only be claimed from a person whose liability in respect of the 
damage has been or could be established in an action against him in England and Wales by or on 
behalf of the person who suffered the damage, although the law applicable to such claim does not 
have to be English law.14 This therefore curtails, possibly severely, the application of the Act only to 
contribution defendants who could have been sued for the underlying claim for damages in the 
English and Welsh courts.   
Under section 1(3) of the Act, liability in contribution remains, irrespective of expiry of a time bar of 
the underlying action by the person who suffered damage against the contribution defendant, so 
long, as the right on which the claim is based is still in existence. This was a change from previous 
                                                          
8 See Royal Brompton NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] UKHL 14; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1397 at [37 - 41], Lord Hope and see Law 
Commission Report on Law of Contract Report on Contribution (LAW COM. No.79) (1977) (HC 181), para 26 ff; Law Com 
Working Paper No 59 (1975) “Contribution” at paras 45(b) and 20 and Mitchell, paras 1.18, 4.20 ff., esp.4.35 ff. The bill was 
drafted so as to give effect, with certain modifications, to the report and recommendations of the Law Commission (Lord 
Scarman, Hansard, HL, series5) vol 395, col 25 (18 July1978); the report, as interpretative aid, can thus give relevant 
insights into the intention of the draftsmen of the Act.  
9 Contribution Act s 6(1): “...whatever the legal basis of his liability, whether tort, breach of contract, breach of trust or 
otherwise”; Royal Brompton NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] UKHL 14; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1397 at [41] Lord Hope and Mitchell 
para 4.22 ff.  
10 Royal Brompton NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] UKHL 14; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1397 (where it was held that damages for delay 
in construction against builders and damages for negligently certifying an extension of time against architects was held not 
to be the same damage) and Beale, Chitty on Contracts, Vol I, General Principles (Sweet & Maxwell, 31st edn, 2012) para 17-
030. 
11 See Friends Provident Life Office v Hillyer Parker May and Rowden [1995] 4 All E.R. 260 CA; cf. obiter dicta of Lord Steyn 
in Royal Brompton Hospital National Health Service Trust v Hammond [2002] UKHL 14; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1397 at [33] and 
discussion thereof in Mitchell paras 4.45 ff.; Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd (No.2) [2004] EWCA Civ 
487; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 319 at [77] Clarke LJ and at [87] Sedley LJ and Charter Plc v City Index Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1382; 
[2008] 2 W.L.R. 950. See also Halsbury's Laws of England, Restitution (Vol 88 (2012)) Discharge of Debts, Contribution, para 
482 and Halsbury's Laws of England, Tort (Vol 97 (2015)), The General Law of Torts, Joint and Several Tortfeasors, para 450.  
12  See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Damages (Vol 29 (2014)), Contribution between Wrongdoers, para 622 and see 
Contribution Act ss 1(3),(5),(6), 2(3) and s 7(3) (b) and discussion below. 
13 Contribution Act s 1(5). 
14 Contribution Act s 1(6) and also see Iveco SpA v Magna Electronics Srl (formerly Italamec Srl) [2015] EWHC 2887 (TCC) 
and XL Insurance Co SE (formerly XL Insurance Co Ltd) v AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance [2015] EWHC 3431 (Comm). 
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case law under the former 1935 Act.15 However where time limitation has the effect of extinguishing 
the right altogether, a right to contribution is no longer available either. And a claim in contribution 
under the 1978 Act itself is barred 2 years after it accrued.16 
Where the issue of liability of the person claiming the contribution has been decided by a judgment, 
he can show that he was held responsible in law and liable to the adjudged amount, although the 
contribution defendant seems not to be estopped from reopening these issues.17 Where the 
contribution claimant made payment based on a bona fide settlement alone, he must show that he 
would have been liable assuming that the factual basis of the claim against him could be 
established.18 
In principle, the amount of the contribution recoverable by any person shall be such as may be 
found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s 
responsibility for the damage in question. The courts have power in any such proceedings to exempt 
any person from liability to make a contribution; or to direct that the contribution to be recovered 
from any person amounts to a complete indemnity. However, where the defendant’s liability to the 
person who has suffered the damage is limited, this will also provide a ceiling for recovery by the 
contribution claimant.19  
The right to recover contribution under the Act supersedes any right, other than an express 
contractual right, to recover contribution otherwise than under the 1978 Act in corresponding 
circumstances, but the Act was not intended to interfere with existing rights to indemnity, whether 
contractual or quasi-contractual20 or with contractual arrangements for contribution.21  
 
However, where a contractual term provided only for an indemnity in carefully specified 
circumstances, but there was no express contractual provision for contribution, the contract would 
not be taken to exclude the statutory right to contribution.22 In section 3 of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940, the equivalent Scottish provision to the saving rule 
of section 7(3)(b) of the English Contribution Act was subject to a decision of the Supreme Court.23 
The question was in particular whether a contractual provision excluding liability, contribution or 
indemnity between the person suffering damage and its contracting party could be enforced against 
a third party, who was jointly liable for the damage, with the effect of excluding the third party’s 
contribution claim against the contracting party. It was held that contribution can only be claimed 
from a party that would be liable to the person who suffered the damage24 in its own right. Where a 
contract between the person who suffered damage and the party asked to contribute excluded such 
liability or contained an indemnity clause protecting against the effects of such liability, the party 
                                                          
15 See George Wimpey & Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corp (BOAC) [1955] A.C. 169; [1954] 3 W.L.R. 932; HL and the 
discussion below at 4.4 c). 
16 See Limitation Act 1980 s 10 and see Halsbury's Laws of England, Limitation Periods (Vol 68 (2008)), Particular Causes of 
Action; Contract, Tort And Other Claims, Contribution para. 1006. 
17 See Mitchell paras 11.11 ff. on court orders in favour of the contribution claimant; a provision such as s 1(5) in favour of 
the contribution defendant is missing in relation to a judgment against the contribution claimant. Contrast the solution in 
CMR art 39 which binds the contribution defendant to the judgment against the carrier claiming contribution, if the 
contribution defendant was given notice of the proceedings and afforded an opportunity of entering and appearance. 
18 Contribution Act s 1(4) and see Mitchell paras 11.16 ff. on settlements and 11.11 ff. on court orders. 
19 Contribution Act s.2. 
20 Mitchell, para 4.37. As per Law Com No 76, 1977 (Report on Contribution) para 26, the Law Commission had defined a 
‘right of indemnity’ in their Report to include rights ‘founded in quasi-contract’ as well as rights ‘created by contract’ (as 
quoted in Mitchell, para 4.37).  
21 See Contribution Act s 7(3). In its second part it reads: “…but nothing in this Act shall affect - (a) any express or implied 
contractual or other right to indemnity; or (b) any express contractual provision regulating or excluding contribution; which 
would be enforceable apart from this Act …”.   
22 Jameson v CEGB [1998] Q.B. 323 CA, reversed on other issues at [2000] 1 A.C. 455 HL. 
23 Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd [2010] UKSC 18, 2010 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 87. 
24 Who had incurred the loss which is the basis of the contribution claim. 
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required to contribute would in effect not have been liable in respect of the loss or damage on which 
the contribution action was founded and consequently owed no contribution.  
 
As will be seen below, there can be difficulties in delineation between the 1978 Act and international 
carriage conventions. In the carriage context only very few implementing instruments specifically 
tackle the issue and exclude the application of the 1978 Act. These are the Carriage of Goods by 
Road Act 1965 in relation to actions between successive carriers 25 and the Rail Passengers’ Rights 
and Obligations Regulations 2010 in relation to parties responsible for the same damage.26  
A recent case decided by the Court of Appeal illustrates some of the problems raised by the Act’s 
interaction with carriage conventions.  
 
 
3. South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages 
 
In South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages27 two main issues had to be decided: firstly, whether a 
contribution claim was regulated by the Athens Convention28 and, secondly, whether the time limit 
provided in the Athens convention was only a time bar or had the effect for extinguishing the right 
of action altogether.  
 
The case concerned the contribution claim pursuant to section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) 
Act 197829 of a health authority against a sea carrier. The employee of the health authority had 
taken part in a corporate team building exercise and had been passenger on board the carrier’s RIB 
(Rigid Inflatable Boat) on the Bristol Channel when incurring a spinal injury. At the time of bringing 
the contribution claim an action for damages against the carrier for personal injury of the passenger 
would have been time barred under the Athens Convention30 and the relevant domestic law 
incorporating the Convention for such domestic carriage.31  
 
                                                          
25 See CoGRA 1965 s.5 Contribution between Carriers. 
26 SI 2010/1504; see s 5 Contribution between parties responsible for damage. 
27 14 July 2015, [2015] EWCA Civ 708. 
28 In this case, the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea of 1974 in its 
statutory application to domestic carriage by the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (Domestic Carriage) 
Order 1987 (SI 1987/670).  
29 Hereafter Contribution Act. 
30 Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea of 1974, and now also in its version as 
amended by its Protocol of 2002: 
The Athens Convention 1974 (with its 1976 Protocol on Special Drawing Rights) applied in UK law by virtue of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995 ss.183–184 and Sch.6 for convention carriage (that is, international carriage) and for domestic carriage 
originally by the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage (Interim Provisions) Order 1980 (SI 1980/1092) and now by 
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (Domestic Carriage) Order 1987 (SI 1987/670) r.3. By virtue of EC 
Regulation on sea passengers (the Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents, OJ L131, 28.05.2009, p.25) the Athens 
Convention in its version of the 2002 Protocol (also referred to as Athens Convention 2002) applied since 31st December 
2012 as a matter of EU law (see also Merchant Shipping (Carriage of Passengers by Sea) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/3152) 
and s.183(2A) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 providing a UK framework for the application of the EC Regulation). Since 
28th May 2014, Sched 6 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 has been amended to give effect to the Athens Convention in 
its version of the 2002 Protocol (also referred to as Athens Convention 2002), but the previous version of the Athens 
Convention remains in force for domestic carriage (see r.3 of the Merchant Shipping (Convention Relating to the Carriage 
of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea) Order 2014) falling outside the application of the EC Regulation on sea passengers 
(see r. 4 of the Merchant Shipping (Carriage of Passengers by Sea) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/3152)); but see the raised 
limits for UK carriers by the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (United Kingdom Carriers) Order 1998 (SI 
1998/2917). 
31 See Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (Domestic Carriage) Order 1987 (SI 1987/670) r.3, as preserved by 
r.3 of The Merchant Shipping (Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea) Order 2014 
after the coming into force of the 2002 Protocol and its implementation into UK law by the 2014 Order. 
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It was argued on behalf of the carrier that the Convention’s stipulation32 that “no action for damages 
for death of or personal injury to a passenger, or for the loss of or damage to luggage, shall be 
brought against a carrier or performing carrier otherwise than in accordance with this Convention” 
meant that no contribution action could be taken outside the Convention’s rules. Under the 
convention however the action was time barred, since article 16 provided that “an action for 
damages arising out of the death of or personal injury to a passenger or for the loss of or damages to 
luggage shall be time-barred after a period of two years”.33  
 
The Court of Appeal34 disagreed on both accounts. The Convention35 provided exclusive rules on 
liability of an actual or performing carrier to a passenger for damages,36 but explicitly without 
prejudice to rights of recourse between a carrier and performing carrier.37 The carriers’ interaction 
inter se was covered no further by the Convention, nor were recourse rights between carriers and 
other parties dealt with by the Convention.38 There was therefore a gap which could be filled by 
other legal or contractual provisions. 
 
Indeed, it was clarified by Lord Hope of Craighead in Sidhu v British Airways Plc39 for air carriage that 
while the Warsaw Convention aimed at holistic harmonisation of those issues that were covered, in 
that the remedies available to passengers could only be those of the Convention and no others, the 
convention only provided partial harmonisation insofar as it covered the issues. While there had 
been controversy whether the Warsaw Convention40 and in particular their limitation provisions 
applied to contribution claims, that it did not was clarified further by the Montreal Convention.41 A 
similar approach was to be taken with the Athens Convention which covered claims by passengers, 
but not claims for contribution between carriers.42  
 
Instead, contribution was covered by English domestic law under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 
1978. However, the convention’s regime and the inherent question of the carrier’s liability to the 
passenger under the convention was nevertheless a critical element for the contribution claim,43 as a 
carrier was only liable for contribution if he would have been liable to the passenger.  
 
                                                          
32 Art 14 of the Athens Convention 1974. 
33 Art 16.1 of the Athens Convention 1974. 
34 The leading judgment was given by Tomlinson LJ; Kitchen LJ and Laws LJ agreed. 
35 See Athens Convention 1974 art 4. Other Conventions also provide similarly:  see Guadalajara Convention, esp. art X; MC 
arts 39 ff. and esp. art 48; HambR art 10, esp. 10.6. 
36 See Athens Convention 1974 art 14. 
37 Athens Convention 1974 art 4.5. 
38 See South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [15-21]. 
39 [1997] AC 430 at 444 and 447. 
40 South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [18]: “In a line of cases the District Court and in one case a State Appellate Court in 
the United States held that Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention applied to recourse actions against carriers – see Magnus 
Electronics Inc v Royal Bank of Canada 611 F Supp 436 (NDIll, 1985), 19 Avi 17,944; Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co 
Ltd v Citizens National Bank of Decatur 581 NE 2d 49 (Ill App, 1991); Royal Insurance Co v Emery Freight Corpn 834 F Supp 
633 (SD NY, 1993). However in Connaught Laboratories Ltd v Air Canada (1978) 23 OR (2d) 176 (Ont HC) the Ontario High 
Court concluded that Article 29 had no effect on the claims of carriers between themselves.” 
41 South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [20] referring to MC art 37, Chubb Insurance Company of Europe SA v Menlo 
Worldwide Forwarding Inc, 32 Avi 15, 978 (CD Cal, 2008) and  Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Issue 142, September 
2014, at paragraph 446.1. In particuar: “In Chubb Insurance Company of Europe SA v Menlo Worldwide Forwarding Inc, 32 
Avi 15, 978 (CD Cal, 2008), followed in Allianz Global Corporate & Speciality v EMO Trans California Inc 34 Avi 15,274 (ND 
Cal, 2010) the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the reference in Article 37 to the existence of a right of 
recourse excluded the applicability of the limitation provisions of Article 35.” 
42 South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [17]. See also Cairns v Northern Lighthouses Board [2013] CSOH 22; [2013] SLT 645 
at [53] for acceptance of a recourse claim against a recourse defendant who could invoke the provisions of the Athens 
Convention against the injured passenger but not against the recourse claimant, the employer of the injured passenger. 
43 South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [21]. 
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However, since there would be no claim for contribution against a contribution debtor if the 
underlying claim against him was no longer in existence,44 the next question for the court was the 
nature of the time bar in article 16 of the Athens Convention. Only if the original claim had been 
extinguished, in contrast to simply having been barred by lapse of time, would this be a valid 
defence against the contribution claim. Tomlinson LJ compared different conventions and their 
wording and the effect that had been connected to them as well as looking at their interpretation in 
cases that had been decided so far. 
 
He contrasted two core themes: on the one hand, was that enshrined in the Warsaw Convention 
“the rights… shall be extinguished”45, in the Limitation Act 1980 in its special provisions dealing with 
conversion46 and with claims to recover land47 and defective products48 stipulating the right of action 
to be extinguished, and in the formulation of the Hague Visby Rules “in any event the carrier and the 
ship shall be discharged”.49 On the other hand, was the approach expressed in the language of the 
Maritime Conventions Act 1911 “no action shall be maintainable to enforce a claim”50, of The 
Brussels Convention on Collisions 1910 “actions for recovery of damage are barred after an interval 
of two years”51 and of the Limitation Act 1980 for time limits for actions for tort or simple contract 
“an action founded on tort/simple contract shall not be brought after the expiration of six years”52 
and in section 14B “(1) An action for damages… shall not be brought after the expiration… (2) This 
section bars the right of action…”53.  
 
In so doing, he elaborated on the cases of Aries Tanker Corporation v Total Transport Limited54 on 
the Hague Visby Rules and maritime conventions and Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
Limited v Larnell (Insurances) Limited (in liquidation)55on the effect of section 14B of the Limitation 
Act 1980 in contrast to other provisions of the same Act. He concluded that there was a clear 
distinction between time limits barring the rights of action or extinguishing them and these 
distinctions had to be observed and their effect noted. This was also the case when interpreting 
international conventions. While their wording was not as decisive as in English statutes, indeed 
their interpretation unconstrained by technical rules of English law or English legal precedent, they 
were construed on broad principles of general acceptation, allowing for other language versions to 
be taken into account.56  
 
On interpretation, the focus was on giving effect to the uniform character of the convention and that 
was to be exclusive of any resort to domestic law, whether one’s own or that of other Convention 
states. While it was important to have regard to any international consensus upon the 
                                                          
44 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 s 1(3). 
45 WC art 29.1. 
46 Limitation Act 1980 s 3(2).  
47 Limitation Act 1980 s 17 and s 18(2) and (3). 
48 Limitation Act 1980 s 11A(3). 
49 HVR art III r.6 and see Aries Tanker Corporation v Total Transport Limited [1977] 1 WLR 185 at 188 Lord Wilberforce. 
50 Maritime Conventions Act s 8, repealed, and see now s 190 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995: “no proceedings to 
which this section applies shall be brought after the period of two years”.   
51 Brussels Convention on Collisions 1910 art 7. 
52 Limitation Act 1980 ss 2 and 5. 
53 South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [26] referring on the interpretation of s 14B to Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme Limited v Larnell (Insurances) Limited (in liquidation) [2005] EWCA Civ 1408, [2006] QB 808. 
54 [1977] 1 WLR 185. 
55 [2005] EWCA Civ 1408, [2006] QB 808. 
56 See South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [29 -30] referring to Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo, Mango and Co. Ltd [1932] AC 328 
at 350 Lord Macmillan and James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (U.K) Ltd, [1978] AC 141 at 152 E Lord 
Wilberforce. 
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understanding of the provisions of international conventions and thus to what courts in other 
jurisdictions suggested, regard had to be given to the actual words used and their meaning.57  
 
While there might not be international consensus on the understanding of the relevant provision 
there seemed to be broad consensus as to a distinction between time limits extinguishing the 
substantive right and those of merely barring the action and there was a related distinguishing 
terminology used by each system of law. The wording of the limitation provisions in the Warsaw and 
Montreal Conventions, according to a general, albeit not uncontested understanding, were 
interpreted as right extinguishing. In contrast, the wording used in the Athens Convention pointed to 
a mere time bar; this was the appropriate effect and in keeping with the plain natural content of the 
words used. A different effect could only be obtained by demonstrating a different autonomous and 
internationally understood meaning, which, however, did not exist in this case.58       
 
Appeal was therefore allowed against the decisions of the lower courts which had dismissed the 
contribution action as extinguished by lapse of time.  
 
The case highlights a number of interesting questions on the application or exclusivity of convention 
systems to recourse or contribution claims and the effect of convention time bars. So, what are the 
convention provisions in this context? 
 
 
4. Cargo transport convention systems on multiple carrier rules and rights of recourse  
 
4.1 Overview 
 
To examine whether a convention provides rules on recourse or contribution between carriers the 
conventions’ rules on multiple carriers are now compiled and contrasted.  
 
Convention or 
system 
Successive carrier rules Contractual and actual carrier rules 
CMR59 
arts 34 - 40 
Strict successive carrier (SC) rules– all carriers 
carrying under same contract and by taking over 
the consignment note liable for complete transit 
(34) 
N/A 
CIM60 
arts 26, 45, 50-52 
arts 27, 45.6 
Strict SC rules -  all carriers carrying under same 
contract and by taking over the consignment note 
liable for complete transit (26); 
No joinder! 
Rules also for substitute carriage (joint 
and several liability)  (27) 
                                                          
57 South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [31] referring to Morris v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2002] 2 AC 628 at 677, Lord 
Hobhouse: “…Whilst it is important to have regard to the international consensus upon the understanding of the provisions 
of international conventions and hence to what the courts in other jurisdictions have had to say about the provision in 
question, the relevant point for decision always remains: what do the actual words used mean? (Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo, 
Mango & Co Ltd [1932] AC 328, the Hague Rules; James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd [1978] 
AC 141, CMR, Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251, Amended Warsaw; Sidhu v BA, sup, Warsaw.)”. 
58 South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [32 - 45], also referring to Berlingieri, Time-Bared Actions, (2nd edn, LLP, 1993). 
59 The United Nations Convention on International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956. 
60 CIM 1999; CIM standing for Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract of International Carriage of Goods by Rail. It is the 
Appendix B to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail 1999 (COTIF). To show CIM’s basis in the COTIF 
Convention, reference is therefore made at times as COTIF-CIM. 
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WS 192961 
art 30 (& 
Guadalajara 
Conv. 1961)62  
SC rules – art 30 - all carriers part of contract to 
extent of their part of carriage; liable generally 
only for own part of carriage 
Actual carrier rules via Guadalajara 
Convention 
MC63  
arts 36, 48 
arts 39 - 48 
SC rules – art 36 – all carriers part of contract to 
extent of their part of carriage; liable generally 
only for own part of carriage 
Actual carrier rules (arts 39 – 48) 
HVR64 
art.III r.6 bis  
N/A N/A 
Hamburg Rules65 
arts 10, 20.4 
N/A Joint and several liability of  
contr. and actual carrier (10.4) 
RR66 
arts 20, 64 
N/A Joint and several liability of  
contr. carrier and maritime perf. 
party (20) 
CMNI67 
arts 4, 24.4 
N/A Joint and several liability of contr. 
and actual carrier (4.5) 
Table1: Overview over convention coverage of regimes on multiple carriers.  
 
As can be seen in Table 1, many of the transport conventions give some guidance on recourse 
actions or contain rules on successive carriers and the apportionment/division of liability amongst 
them, often also including rules on which carrier can be sued by cargo.68  If applicable, these 
international rules ought to take priority over any other domestic provisions.69  
 
While many of the conventions give a right of action to the cargo claimant against the actual carrier 
alongside the contractual carrier,70 often explicitly stipulating their joint and several liability,71 they 
mostly leave rights of recourse between the carriers unregulated.72 Some conventions are limited to 
highlighting that recourse actions are not affected by the convention,73 whereas others give a 
minimum timeframe for limitation of recourse actions.74  
 
                                                          
61 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw) 1929. 
62 The Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules to International Carriage 
by Air Performed by a Person other than the Contracting Carrier (Guadalajara) 1961. 
63 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal) 1999. 
64 The International Convention for the Unification of certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading of 1924 (Hague Rules) as 
amended by the 1968 Brussels Protocol (Visby Protocol) (Hague-Visby Rules). 
65 The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg) 1978 (Hamburg Rules). 
66 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Rotterdam) 
2008 (Rotterdam Rules). 
67 The Convention on the Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Inland Waterway (Budapest) 2001 (CMNI). 
68 See the land and air conventions, CMR arts 34 – 40, CIM arts 26, 45, 50-52, WS art 30, and MC art 36-37. 
69 See e.g. CoGSA 1965 s 5(1), Rail Passengers' Rights and Obligations Regulations 2010/1504, Pt 2(2) reg. 5(1) and see Civil 
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (hereafter Contribution Act) s 7(3)(a). See also the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969), arts 26 – 29; Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013), p.172 and the discussion below at 
4.3 d) on recourse time bars under CIM.   
70 See the air conventions the Warsaw regime via the Guadalajara Convention, MC arts 39 – 45, the sea and inland 
waterway conventions, HambR art 10, RR arts 19 and 20, CMNI art 4 and the rail convention in its provision for a substitute 
carrier, CIM art 27. 
71 See the sea and inland waterway conventions, HambR art 10.4, RR art 20, CMNI art 4 and the rail convention in its 
provision for a substitute carrier, CIM art 27. 
72 See as an exemption from this rules the CMNI with its article 4.1, providing that the convention liability rules also apply 
between contracting and actual carrier. 
73 See Guadalajara Convention art X, MC arts 37 and 48,  
74 See the sea and inland waterway conventions, HVR art III r6 bis, HambR art 20.4, RR art 64, CMNI art 24.4 
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Since the conventions are mandatory to differing degree, awareness of the extent of the 
conventions’ provisions on recourse claims and possible gaps that could be filled contractually is 
essential. Some of the conventions only prohibit that the carrier reduces his liability,75 but others 
require that all their rules are adhered to.76  
 
Indeed the most extensive coverage of carriers inter se, where they are falling within the framework 
of successive carriers is provided by the CMR77 and to a lesser degree by CIM with some much more 
limited provisions in the air conventions. 
 
4.2 CMR: 
 
a) Successive carrier provisions 
The CMR regulates successive carriers in Arts 34 – 40. If the carriers are carrying as true successive 
carriers, that is, under one contract as enshrined in the consignment note and by taking over the 
goods and the consignment note, they all become liable for the performance of the contract as a 
whole.78 However as a counterpart to this wide-ranging liability suit against them is limited. The 
cargo claimant only has the right to sue the first carrier, the last carrier or the carrier responsible for 
the goods at the time the event resulting in the liability occurred, although he can sue more than 
one of these carriers at any one time.79  
 
b) The system of recourse 
The liability between successive carriers is ultimately determined according to causality: the carrier 
or carriers who have caused the loss or damage are to be solely liable. A carrier who has paid 
compensation can recover the compensation paid according to these principles from the carriers 
responsible. If the cause of the loss cannot be determined, all carriers share in the compensation in 
proportion to the share of payment of the carriage charges due to them. Where a carrier is insolvent 
his share will be absorbed by the others in the same way, in proportion to the share of carriage 
charges due to them.80 Recourse claims are possible in one and the same forum against all carriers in 
the court of the country whereof one of the successive carriers involved in the carriage has his place 
of business,81 yet the place of business of the carrier suing for recourse cannot provide the 
connecting factor to allow suit in his home country.82 However, the successive carrier whose place of 
                                                          
75 See CIM art 5 which outs the decreasing of the carriers liability but allows for agreement of greater and more 
burdensome obligations of the carrier than provided in the Rules; under the HR and HVR – art III r.8 a carrier cannot be 
relieved from liability and similar as per RR art 79 and HambR art 23.1 &23.2 provisions to the extent that they limit or 
decrease obligations and liability of carrier are void. 
76 See e.g. CMR art 41 which is strict and does not allow change whether increasing or decreasing a carrier’s liability other 
than amendments to the liability regime of successive carriers (CIM art 40); see also the CMNI art 25.1 according to which 
contractual stipulations that exclude, limit or increase liability of the carrier are null and void; and WC arts 23 & 32 and MC 
art 26 &49 where a clause infringing the provisions of the convention is null and void, but MC allows for some freedom for 
the carrier to waive defences in art 27. 
77On their definition, their liability outwardly and inter se, time limits and rights of suit and jurisdiction. 
78 CMR art 34 and see Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR (6th edn, Informa Law, 2014) (hereafter 
Clarke), para 50 ff.; Messent, Glass, Hill & Messent, CMR: Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (3rd 
edn, LLP, 2000) (hereafter Hill & Messent) para 11.1 ff.; and Schmidt, Herber, Münchener Kommentar zum 
Handelsgesetzbuch, Band 7, §§ 407 – 619 Transportrecht (3nd edn, Verlag C H Beck, 2014) (hereafter MüKo HGB) CMR, art 
34, para 8 ff. (Jesser-Huß). 
79 CMR art 36. 
80 CMR arts 37-38. 
81 CMR art 39.2; and these rules are different from the forum rules in cargo claims, which are regulated in CMR art 31; and 
see British American Tobacco Switzerland SA v Exel Europe Ltd [2015] UKSC 65, [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, in particular see [33 – 
42]. 
82 See Cummins Engine Co Ltd v Davis Freight Forwarding (Hull) Ltd [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1363; [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 402 (CA), 
Clarke, para 53 ff., Hill & Messent para 11.119 ff. and also MüKo HGB, CMR, art 39, para.7. 
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business has been chosen to found jurisdiction does not have to be a defendant.83 The carriers from 
whom contribution is claimed cannot dispute the validity of the payment made by the claiming 
carrier if the amount of the compensation was determined by judicial authority made after the 
carriers from whom contribution is sought were notified of the proceedings and afforded an 
opportunity to enter an appearance.84 Suit must generally be brought within one year,85 from 
judgment against the carrier or, if settled out of court, from actual payment of the claim. 
 
c) Mandatory application 
The CMR provides for mandatory application of its rules and variation of its provisions is thus 
generally not possible.86 However, CMR carriers can vary the final distribution of carrier liability 
amongst each other.87 Yet, this freedom to contract on other terms does not extend to amending 
the time limits provided by the Convention, 88 whether amongst successive carriers or otherwise.89  
 
d) Boundaries 
Where a carrier is not a successive carrier but a sub-contracted carrier, he will carry under the CMR90 
under his own contract, possibly made with the principal carrier as sender, and the ordinary rules of 
suit including the general limitation periods apply, that is, from the time of the damaging event, 
irrespective of any contract terms to the contrary.91 It has therefore been observed that where 
limitation is an issue, some jurisdictions have broadened the definition of a successive carrier or 
applied the limitation provision between successive carriers by analogy to any carrier – sub-carrier 
relationship. Whether this is appropriate is open to discussion and disputed.92 Discussion goes even 
so far as to query the appropriateness of the successive carrier system altogether.93  
 
Indeed much case law has been provided on the successive carrier concept and it seems that English 
law, for now,94 has found its own particular solution, allowing for the taking over of the goods and 
the consignment note by an agent on behalf of the principal – possibly even an undisclosed 
principal,95 thus enabling a fictitious handing down of the goods and the consignment note for the 
purpose of fulfilling the requirements of article 34 of the CMR.   
                                                          
83 See CMR art 39.2, Cummins Engine Co Ltd v Davis Freight Forwarding (Hull) Ltd [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1363; [1981] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 402 (CA), Clarke, para 53 ff., Hill & Messent para 11.119 ff. and also MüKo HGB, CMR, art 39, para.7. 
84 CMR art 39.1. 
85 Unless there is wilful misconduct, in which case there is a three year limitation period, see art 39.4. 
86 Whether by standard conditions of carriage or otherwise, see CMR art 41. 
87 CMR art 40, allowing changes to the allocation in arts 37 and 38 only. In particular, CMR art 39 cannot be contracted out 
of. 
88 CMR art.39.4 applies the art.32 one year limitation period, yet the period only begins from the date of the last judicial 
decision fixing the amount of compensation payable or, in the absence of a judicial decision, the date of payment. 
89 See CMR art 40 and 41. 
90 Providing there is international transport involving a convention state as per CMR art 1. 
91 CMR art 41. So also the Swedish position: see H Tiberg, J Schelin On Maritime and Transport Law (4th edn Axel Ax:son 
Johnson Institute for Maritime and other Transport Law 2014) 167 with reference to Swedish Supreme Court, NJA 
1996.211: the time bar of CMR art 32 is also applicable between carriers and sub-carriers. 
92 See Hill & Messent para 11.11 ff. and Clarke, para 44b(i) with further references to French, German and Austria 
decisions; in favour also Staub HGB, CMR, art 34, paras 23 ff and art 39, paras 2 and 12 (Helm) with further references and 
also to Austrian case-law. Cf. for the strict application of the successive carrier requirements see Tiberg & Schelin, On 
Maritime and Transport Law (4th edn, Axel Ax:son Johnson Institute for Maritime and other Transport Law, 2014) p 167 
with reference to Swedish Supreme Court, NJA 1996.211; MüKo HGB, CMR, art 37, para 2 - 3 and CMR, art 39 paras 2, 9 
(Jesser-Huß); Thume, art 39, para 2 (Schmid) and Koller, CMR, art 39, para 5. 
93 MüKo HGB, CMR, art 34 para 7 (Jesser-Huß). 
94 See British American Tobacco Switzerland SA v Exel Europe Ltd [2015] UKSC 65, [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173 at [13]. 
95 In English law one may mostly be able to come to a contractual relationship including the primary contractual carrier as 
carrier under the CMR consignment note by means of implied (and possibly undisclosed) agency, so that the carrier issuing 
or taking over the consignment note does so also on behalf of the carriers up the chain (even if he does not disclose any 
agency relationship for the issue of the consignment note) – see Messent, Glass, Hill & Messent, CMR: Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods by Road (3rd edn, LLP, 2000) paras 11.19 f and 11.42 f; Glass and Cashmore, Introduction to 
the Law of Carriage of Goods (Sweet & Maxwell, 1989), para 7.74; Clarke para 50b(i) and Coggins T/A PC Transport v LKW 
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e) Extended application of the successive carrier notion 
 
However is such a broad understanding of the notion of successive carriers necessary to effect 
recourse between carriers or could the same result be achieved by means of the Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1978?  Indeed in discussing relevant case-law on such extension Professor Clarke 
remarked: “…imputed agency like this does little to recommend English law to lawyers abroad”,96 
and while in a recent decision the parties assumed this broad successive carrier notion, Lord Mance 
seemed to question its unequivocal acceptance.97  
 
Section 5 of the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 only ousts the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 
1978 insofar as the matter falls within article 34 and the Chapter VI CMR rules on successive 
carriers.98 If, however, there are no successive carriers in the sense of article 34, one may think that 
section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 could take its place for contribution claims.99  
What therefore has the 1978 Act to offer? Contribution can be claimed under the 1978 Act by a 
person liable in respect of any damage to another person from any other person who is liable for the 
same damage,100 so also by one carrier for damage caused to the same cargo carried from another 
carriage who is liable for the cargo damage to the cargo claimant. It does not matter whether the 
liability is in contract, tort of bailment.101 Thus, these requirements should normally be fulfilled 
where several carriers are involved, whether as successive or sub-contracted carriers, in the carriage 
of goods and where the cargo is lost, damaged or delayed. For example, a primary contractual 
carrier102 is liable in contract to the consignor or consignee for any loss or damage caused and the 
sub-contractor he used is also liable to the same consignor/consignee, either in contract under a 
consignment note in favour of the consignor/consignee or in tort or bailment for any loss or damage 
to the goods while in his care; equally for any sub-sub-contractors.  
 
It will be remembered that under the 1978 Act the court has discretion to award any contribution 
that it thinks “just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the 
damage in question”103 and this allows the court to decide between a complete exemption from 
liability for contribution to ordering full indemnity.104 Therefore, the rules of the 1978 Act allow the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Walter International Transportorganisation AG [1999] Lloyd’s Rep 255 (CLCC (BL) = Central London County Court (Business 
List)), but also see the questioning comment by Lord Mance in British American Tobacco Switzerland SA v Exel Europe Ltd 
[2015] UKSC 65, [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173 at [13]. Indeed, whether principles of English agency law should be applied to what is 
in effect the definition of a successive carrier under the CMR as international convention is questionable. On agency in the 
carriage context in general see Bugden, chs 1 and 2. In this vein, see also the recent broad interpretation of the successive 
carrier notion according to the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 11th September 2015, case no.14/03211. 
96 See Clarke para 50b(i) discussing Ulster-Swift Ltd. and Another v. Taunton Meat Haulage Ltd. and Another [1977] 1 W.L.R. 
625; [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 346 (CA) and Coggins T/A PC Transport v LKW Walter International Transportorganisation AG 
[1999] Lloyd’s Rep 255 (CLCC (BL) = Central London County Court (Business List)). 
97 See British American Tobacco Switzerland SA v Exel Europe Ltd [2015] UKSC 65, [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173 at [13]. 
98 Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965, section 5 reads: “Contribution between carriers. 
(1) Where a carrier under a contract to which the Convention applies is liable in respect of any loss or damage for which 
compensation is payable under the Convention, nothing in [section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978], or 
section 3(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 shall confer on him any right to 
recover contribution in respect of that loss or damage from any other carrier who, in accordance with article 34 in 
the Schedule to this Act, is a party to the contract of carriage.  
(2) The preceding subsection shall be without prejudice to the operation of article 37 in the Schedule to this Act.” 
99 See also Mitchell, para 4.54 and Hill & Messent para 11.81.  For an overview on contribution under the 1978 Act see 
above at 2) and on contribution in the carriage context see also Hill & Messent, paras 11.71 ff (on CMR) and Bugden, paras 
11-013 – 11-020 (general overview). 
100 Contribution Act s.1(1). 
101 Contribution Act s.1(1) and s.6(1). And see above at 2) and Mitchell, paras 4.35 – 4.37 on the ambit of the Act. 
102 Or possibly better called the principal contractor. 
103 Contribution Act s.2(1). 
104 Contribution Act s.2(2). 
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court a wide discretion and while they do not exactly mirror the CMR provisions on contribution, the 
spirit is similar: the person responsible for the damage shall ultimately pay. The Act enforces limits 
imposed whether by law or by agreement between parties105 and this is similar to the CMR’s 
adherence to the liability limits and any carrier agreements allowed by article 40 as to the share of 
any compensation due. Since the CMR only provides for a bar of the remedy as a consequence of the 
expiry of the time period fur suit,106 there should be no issue on limitation; the 1978 Act allowing a 
contribution claim for an underlying time barred action being made, as long as the underlying claim 
is not extinguished.107  
 
One may think that this would therefore mean that if one took a claim between carriers not to fall 
within the provisions of Chapter VI of the CMR, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 would 
provide a basis for contribution and the claim would expire only after two years of payment of the 
cargo claim by, or judgment against, the carrier seeking the contribution.108 One may also think that 
the rules of the CMR as to jurisdiction between successive carriers as defined in article 34 CMR 
would then equally not apply, and the Brussels I Regulation109 provisions or English procedural rules 
on joining third parties110 or otherwise would be available uncurtailed.  
However the first caveat is that the Contribution Act only applies to claims against a contribution 
defendant who could have been sued for damages in England or Wales; leaving contribution claims 
against carriers against whom jurisdiction could not be founded in the English courts uncovered111 
and open to suit only on fulfilment of the requirements of other causes of action, such as contract, 
tort, bailment or restitution, between these carriers with the insofar related difficulties.112 
And further, what if, the sub-contract between the primary contractor and a sub-contracting carrier 
called to contribute was a CMR contract? Whilst this is not the case for domestic carriage,113 the 
CMR applies to international carriage of goods by road, as long as either the place of taking over the 
goods or the place designated for delivery is a place in a contracting State.114 For the subcontract the 
primary carrier would be the sender and his sub-contractor for international carriage the CMR 
carrier.115 In this case, would not the rules of the CMR, which are mandatory,116 override the 
domestic provisions? It is submitted this is so. The relationship between sender and CMR carrier, 
irrespective of whether these parties are both carriers would have priority; whether the sender 
himself is liable to another person should not alter the application of the CMR provisions to a CMR 
contract of carriage.  
 
                                                          
105 Contribution Act s.2(3). 
106 CMR art 32.4, even though, once time barred it is not exercisable by way of counter-claim or set-off either. And see 
below at 5). 
107 Contribution Act s.1(3). 
108 Limitation Act 1980 s.10(1). 
109 The EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ L351, 20.12.2012, p1, which as of 10th January 2015 has replaced Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters, OJ L012, 16.01.2001, p1. 
110 Depending on the fulfilment of the requirements of Brussels I Recast, inter alia the place of domicile of the defendant. 
111 Contribution Act 1978 s 1(6) and also see Iveco SpA v Magna Electronics Srl (formerly Italamec Srl) [2015] EWHC 2887 
(TCC) and XL Insurance Co SE (formerly XL Insurance Co Ltd) v AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance [2015] EWHC 3431 
(Comm). 
112 And on the condition that jurisdiction for such causes of action can itself be founded in England; see also Takahashi pp 
18 f. and 23 ff.  
113 Where the 1978 Act can apply freely. 
114 CMR, art 1.1. 
115 This may be repeated several times down the line, where the sub-contractor sub-sub-contracts etc. 
116 As per article 41. 
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If one nevertheless suggested application of the Contribution Act, one may argue that section 
7(3)(a)117 clarifies that the 1978 Act was intended to preserve the claimants’ contractual and other 
rights to indemnity.118 Where the primary carrier can claim from his sub-contractor an indemnity for 
his own liability to the cargo interests who had contracted with him, because the loss or damage 
occurred while the goods were in charge of the sub-contractor,119 the contractual rights as 
determined by the CMR convention would apply. And they would apply, it is submitted, with all the 
accompanying rules as to enforcement, such as jurisdiction, time bar, etc. The jurisdictional rules 
applicable would be those of article 31.1 CMR, offering several fora, without allowing exclusivity to 
be given to jurisdiction agreements, rather than the ones between successive carriers of article 39.2 
which would allow to sue all successive carriers at the place of domicile of one of them; equally the 
time bar to be applied would be that of article 32.1 CMR rather than the extended timeframe of 39.4 
between successive carriers.  
 
As per article 41 CMR the provisions of the CMR cannot be derogated from, and, even between 
carriers, time bar provisions are not negotiable.120 This suggests therefore that even where the CMR 
applied between carriers inter se the provisions of article 32 on the one year time bar would have to 
be applied and the English Contribution Act with a 2 year time bar could not change this. This is in 
contrast, for example, to the solution found in the Montreal Convention, which leaves the 
relationship of contracting and actual carriers between themselves, including rights of recourse and 
indemnification, to party agreement and domestic law,121 but note the stipulation in the CMNI for 
inland waterways, that the convention applies also between the contractual and actual carrier.122  
 
Thus, the use of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 does not remedy the dilemma created by a 
narrow interpretation of the successive carrier concept, with the resulting jurisdictional rules and 
short limitation period. The longer period of limitation would then only be available by analogy 
between carriers as used in some jurisdictions.123 The concept as widened by the agency approach of 
the English courts, yet still requiring carriage under the same international contract seems to plough 
a middle ground; at least in general, despite some excesses such as Harrison & Sons Ltd v RT Stewart 
Transport Ltd,124 where the concept had been, it is suggested erroneously, applied without meeting 
all of the requirements. However, this approach seems to be a unique one only available due to the 
particular concepts of English agency law,125 which is not particularly conducive to a harmonised 
interpretation of the CMR as international convention.126  
 
 
4.3 COTIF-CIM  
 
a) General  
                                                          
117 Civil Liability (Contribution ) Act 1978, s 7(3) reads: “The right to recover contribution in accordance with section 1 
above supersedes any right, other than an express contractual right, to recover contribution (as distinct from indemnity) 
otherwise than under this Act in corresponding circumstances; but nothing in this Act shall affect— 
(a) any express or implied contractual or other right to indemnity; or 
(b) any express contractual provision regulating or excluding contribution; 
which would be enforceable apart from this Act (or render enforceable any agreement for indemnity or contribution which 
would not be enforceable apart from this Act).”  
118 Mitchell, para 4.37. And see discussion below at 4.3.d) on the effect of s.7(3).  
119 Without the latter being relieved from liability by article 17 CMR. 
120 CMR, art 40. 
121 Montreal Convention, art 48. And see Carriage by Air Act 1961 s.5 and above at 4.4 a).  
122 CMNI art 4.1. 
123 See above note 90. 
124 [1993] 28 E.T.L. 747 (QB). 
125 Insofar also Western Digital Corp v British Airways Plc [2001] QB 733 (CA), [43].  
126 See Clarke para 50b(i). However see also the broad interpretation of the successive carrier notion according to the 
decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 11th September 2015.  
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COTIF-CIM was the original source for the successive carrier concept, as at the time of state railways, 
through transport by one single provider was impossible and the service had to be performed by 
different carriers carrying the goods in succession to their final destination. While the CIM successive 
carrier concept is similar to that now enshrined in the CMR, CIM’s provisions contain some differing 
approaches. 
 
b) Successive Carrier requirements and similarities with CMR 
The similarities encompass a requirement to be a successive carrier in order to be liable for the 
whole journey.127 Equally, a successive carrier is one who carries the goods together with other 
carriers under a single contract by taking over the goods and the consignment note. CIM also 
contains similar provisions as to the division of final liability amongst the carriers based on causality, 
failing this based on the division of shares in the freight due, which can be varied by agreement.128  
 
While all carriers are liable under the CIM contract, only the first, the last, or the carrier in whose 
care the goods were lost or damaged can be sued by the cargo claimant,129 or the carrier who was 
entered with his consent as the carrier to deliver the goods at destination.130 The last carrier in art 
45.1 is therefore interpreted, not as the carrier entered to deliver the goods if he in fact never 
received them, but the carrier who had been the last to take part in the actual contract by taking 
over the goods and the consignment note.131 Indeed the carrier who gave consent to be entered into 
the consignment note as last carrier due to deliver the goods could already be sued in his own right 
according to article 45.2. This interpretation of the last carrier also goes in line with the 
interpretation of the equivalent provision in the CMR, the wording of which was adopted in the 
revision of article 45.1 of CIM. However the interpretation of the last carrier notion under the CMR is 
not entirely undisputed either.132   
 
c) Recourse procedure: 
Thereafter, however we find subtle but important differences and CIM, for example, is rather strict 
in protecting the carriers from suit and the costs related to it. Whether for actions of the cargo 
claimant or the carrier seeking recourse a choice of defendant must be made and is final on bringing 
action.133 CIM has not adopted the solution of article 36 in fine of the CMR, which allows the cargo 
claimant to sue several carriers at once; instead it gives the option to sue only one of the carriers; 
which carrier is at the choice of the claimant. Once an action is brought against one carrier the right 
to choose is extinguished.134 The reason given was that carriers by rail did not have the same 
problems of solvency as road carriers had, so that plurality of suit was not necessary.135 This 
protection of rail carriers from exposure to law suits on compensation is further backed up by a 
prohibition of joining recourse actions with proceedings for compensation.136  
 
                                                          
127 See CIM arts 49 ff and 3(a) for the definition of “carrier”, as opposed to „substitute carrier“, and MüKo HGB, CIM, Vor 
art 49, para. 1. 
128 See CIM arts 49-50 with 52. 
129 CIM art 45.1. 
130 CIM art 45.2 - this part provision is different to the CMR, where this is not included. 
131 This is explained as a result of redrafting the provision for CIM 1999. See the previous version of the article, CIM 1980 
art 55.3: “Other actions arising from the contract of carriage may be brought against the forwarding railway, the railway of 
destination or the railway on which the event giving rise to the proceedings occurred. Such actions may be brought against 
the railway of destination even if it has received neither the goods nor the consignment note.“ and the Explanatory Report 
to CIM 1999 art 26 para 3, art 45 para 2. Cf. MüKo HGB, CIM, art 45, para 10 (Freise) and Koller, CIM, art 45, para 2, fn 6 
who also require this last carrier to deliver the goods. 
132 See e.g. Hill & Messent, para 11.63 ff., MüKo HGB, CMR, Art 36 para 5 (Jesser-Huß), MüKo HGB, CIM, art 45 para 10 
(Freise) and Koller, CIM, art 45, para 2, fn 6 and Explanatory Report to CIM 1999 art 45 para 2. 
133 CIM arts 45.7 and 51.2. 
134 See CIM art 45.7 and Explanatory Report to CIM 1999, art 45, para 1 and MüKo HGB, CIM, art. 45, para.2. 
135 Explanatory Report to CIM 1999, art 45, para 1.  
136 CIM art 51.6. 
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Limiting the rail carrier’s exposure to suit as well as minimising the costs and expenses incurred in 
litigation as a theme can be further observed in the procedure for recourse actions. Similar to the 
CMR, proceedings may be brought against all successive carriers in the court where one of the 
defendant carriers has his principal place of business, at the choice of the claimant carrier.137 
However, under CIM, recourse actions between successive carriers must be made against all carriers 
in the same court and proceedings, otherwise the right of recourse against any carriers not so sued 
is lost.138 In the same vein, the court must decide over all of the carriers in one and the same 
judgment.139 
 
d) Time bar for recourse actions: 
A further difference is the provision, or lack thereof, on a time bar for recourse actions. In contrast 
to the CMR, CIM does not provide for such a time limit which appears to have been left to domestic 
law. For COTIF implementations140 and the embedding of the EU Rail Passenger Rights Regulation,141 
in neither, the Railways (Convention on International Carriage by Rail) Regulations 2005 nor the Rail 
Passengers’ Rights and Obligations Regulations 2010,142 has any provision been made regarding 
limitation of recourse claims between carriers based on carriage within the Regulations and thus 
COTIF-CIM, COTIF-CIV143 or the EU Rail Passenger Rights Regulation.  
 
 
In England and Wales, if taken as a contract, quasi-contract or tort claim or a claim for sums 
recoverable by statute (which had been taken to encompass contribution-type claims), limitation 
would be 6 years,144 yet as, and only as, a statutory contribution claim under the Civil Lability 
(Contribution) Act 1978 the special limit would be 2 years from the date of judgment or award or, if 
no judgment was rendered, from the date of payment.145 How would the recourse claim thus be 
classified - which of the above would it be? Would it be the 6-year limit or would a recourse claim 
under CIM be classified as a claim falling within the Contribution Act resulting in a 2-year time bar? 
 
Unlike the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965, implementing the CMR, which gives explicit priority 
to the provisions of successive carriage under the CMR146 and insofar also disapplies the Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1978,147 the Railways (Convention on International Carriage by Rail) Regulations 
                                                          
137 CIM art 51.3 and 51.4. 
138 CIM art 51.2.  
139 CIM art 51.3. 
140 Apart from CIM, in Annexe B, COTIF contains several other Annexes, including rules on passenger transportation in the 
Uniform Rules concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by (CIV). Since the focus of the 
article is on freight forwarding and carriage of goods, reference is only made to CIV where necessary and relevant for a 
comparison. 
141 The Regulation (EU) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on rail 
passenger’s rights and obligations, implementing with some slight changes the provisions of COTIF-CIV for rail passengers 
(hereafter EU Rail Passenger Rights Regulation). 
142 SI 2010/1504, giving effect to the EU Rail Passenger Rights Regulation. 
143 Whether direct or via the EU Rail Passenger Rights Regulation incorporating the successive carrier rules of CIV (see EU 
Rail Passenger Rights Regulation art 11, incorporating inter alia Title VII of COTIF-CIV). 
144 Limitation Act 1980, ss 2, 5 and 9. See also Law Commission Report on Limitation of Actions of 2001 (LAW COM No. 270) 
paras 2.71 ff., inter alia referring to Re Farmizer (Products) Ltd [1997] 1 BCLC 589 144, applying s 9(1) of the 1980 Act to a 
claim under s 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 against a director for a contribution towards a company’s assets and Rowan 
Companies Inc v Lambert Eggink Offshore Transport Consultants VOF (No 2) [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443, David Steel J 
followed Re Farmizer holding that the application of s 9(1) of the 1980 Act was not restricted to liquidated sums, but that it 
applied to any monetary relief whether in the form of a debt, damages, compensation or otherwise. 
145 According to the Limitation Act 1980, s 10. 
146 While the CMR also includes time bar provisions for successive carrier recourse actions. 
147 Section 5 of the CoGRA 1965 on Contribution between carriers states: “(1) Where a carrier under a contract to which 
the Convention applies is liable in respect of any loss or damage for which compensation is payable under the Convention, 
nothing in section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, or section 3(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 shall confer on him any right to recover contribution in respect of that loss or damage from 
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2005148 implementing the COTIF Convention, omit any such provision. Could this omission lead to 
conflict between the COTIF Convention and the English Contribution Act and thus also impact the 
question of classification of the recourse action? COTIF -CIM149 contains stipulations on recourse 
actions between successive carriers150 and provides for the mandatory application of its uniform 
rules,151 while the right provided by the English Contribution Act, in principle, is to supersede any 
other right to contribution.152  
 
Several solutions are possible to manage this conflict: one could either interpret the Rail Regulation 
to contain such priority of the convention stipulations by analogy or, at least, one could interpret the 
provisions of the Contribution Act sympathetic to CIM. That a disapplication provision is included in 
the later passed Rail Passengers’ Rights and Obligations Regulations 2010,153 may point to a 
legislative oversight in the 2005 Regulations, rather than to the alternative: an intentional change of 
direction so as not to give effect to the convention obligations in favour of national law.  
 
Under section 7(3) the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 the right to recover contribution under 
the Act supersedes any right, other than an express contractual right, to recover contribution 
otherwise than under the 1978 Act in corresponding circumstances, which could be an issue with 
giving priority to the CIM provisions. However the section provides further that nothing in the Act 
shall affect an “express or implied contractual or other right to indemnity”. A right to indemnity may 
also arise by statute.154 One may wish to argue therefore that an action for recourse based on art.50 
CIM is the enforcement of such an indemnity right distinct from a contribution action under the 
1978 Act with the result of achieving the intended priority of CIM. This type of scenario as per CIM 
contribution regime, seems however not to have been considered by the Law Commission at the 
time of formulating the Law Reform Proposals and the words of contribution and indemnity had 
been carefully chosen.155  
 
Even if one concluded that art.50 CIM confers rights to contribution rather than indemnity and thus 
does not fall within the exemption of the 1978 Act,156 the CIM provisions should be applied. After all, 
courts are required to interpret ambiguities in the law in a manner that is consistent with the treaty 
and thus the international obligations of the United Kingdom.157 Courts should therefore give priority 
to the convention provisions over the 1978 Act or, at the very least, give full credit to the 
convention’s stipulations when applying their discretion in apportioning contribution under the 1978 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
any other carrier who, in accordance with article 34 in the Schedule to this Act, is a party to the contract of carriage. (2) The 
preceding subsection shall be without prejudice to the operation of article 37 in the Schedule to this Act.” 
148 SI 2005/2092. 
149 As indeed COTIF-CIV, in Chapter VII. 
150 See CIM arts 49- 52. 
151 CIM art 5. 
152 Contribution Act s 7(3) and set out in more detail below. 
153 The 2010 Rail Passenger Regulations s 5 entitled Contribution between parties responsible for damage reads: “(1) 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (entitlement to and assessment of contribution) do not apply 
where liability for contribution between persons liable in respect of the same damage is governed by the European 
Regulation. (2) In paragraph (1), ‘contribution between persons liable in respect of the same damage’ has the same 
meaning as in section 1(1) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (entitlement to contribution).” Paras (3) – (4) have 
equivalent provisions dis-applying the operation of section 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 
1940. 
154 See Halsbury’s Law of England/Damages Vol 12(1) Reissue para 837 note 11. 
155 Law of Contract Report on Contribution (LAW COM. No.79), para 26 ff (see in particular para 27 on definition of 
contribution and indemnity as used in the Report). See also Working Paper No 59 “Contribution” at para 14, consistently 
with the Law Commission Report at para 27, only using the word indemnity where a total indemnity is referred to; it is thus 
unlikely that a regime similar to the CIM successive carrier contribution regime, which, depending on causality, gives 
contribution or full indemnity claims to successive carriers, was thought of at the time when stipulating section 7(3).  
156 Depending on the interpretation of the notion of indemnity used in the Act. 
157 See Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013), p.172. 
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Act.158 In analogy with the Road and Passenger Rail implementation provisions159 it seems that the 
convention provisions would have been intended to have priority, had the issue been fully 
considered at the time of the devolved law making/implementation.160  
 
Where does this therefore leave the limitation period? How the priority of the CIM provisions is 
achieved has impact on the limitation period as this will decide the classification of a recourse action 
as an action under the Contribution Act or as an action independently under CIM. It seems that the 
limitation period of 2 years under section 10 of the Limitation Act 1980 is not applicable if the 
contribution claims falls outside the Contribution Act161 and that, where the contribution is provided 
for by statue, this falls within s 9(1)162 of the 1980 Act the consequence is that a 6 year limitation 
applies.   
 
e) Type of carriers qualifying as successive carriers:  
In contrast to the CMR where only road carriers can be successive carriers, under CIM, successive 
carriers can not only be rail carriers, but also road or inland waterway carriers – as opposed to 
substitute carriers, who can only be rail carriers.163 
 
However this may create problems of delineation with other regimes that may be applicable. CIM 
and thus the possible extension of the successive carrier regime to other transport modes generally 
only applies to supplementary transport to rail carriage if domestic.164 Therefore the delineation 
would be between national law and CIM, yet for international on-carriage the Budapest Convention 
for Inland Waterways (CMNI) or the CMR could apply.165 Consequently, the applicable regime and 
thus whether the supplementary carrier falls within the successive carriage rules of CIM will depend 
on whether the supplementary transport stops before crossing a border or not. Where on-carriage 
was international road carriage the CMR would be applicable instead, where carriage involved was 
at least from or to a contracting state, even if no road consignment note was issued and the carrier 
simply took over the rail consignment note.166 The same would apply for the CMNI for international 
inland waterway carriage where no specific transport document is needed.167   
 
For example, where we had an international rail transport to Maastricht under CIM followed by a 
short road on-transport of only a few kilometres across the border to Lanaken in Belgium, the road 
leg would fall outside the CIM provisions (and into those of the CMR), whereas the longer on-
transport to Sittard in the Netherlands would fall into the CIM provisions and the road carrier would 
be part of the successive carrier regime of CIM. Thus, the same carrier could be liable under the CIM 
successive carrier regime if the on-transport remained in the same country and would fall outside 
these rules for international on-transport, presumably even where the carrier had agreed to be 
entered with his consent as delivering carrier into the consignment note,168 as CIM would then not 
                                                          
158 Leading in fact to a reduction of discretion to zero.  
159 s.5 of the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 and in s 5 of the Rail Passengers’ Rights and Obligations Regulations 2010. 
160 See also Halsbury’s Laws of England, Carriage and Carriers (Vol 7 (2015), International Carriage by Road and Rail, 
International Carriage by Rail, para 750, setting out the Convention rights of recourse rules between carriers without 
further discussion of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act other than pointing out its disapplication in case of carriage by EU 
Rail Passenger Regulation. 
161 See also H G Beale et al, Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) para 28-015 note 70 and Hampton v 
Minns [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1. 
162 Section 9 is headed: “Time limits for actions for sums recoverable by statute”. 
163 See CIM art 26 and 27 and CIM Explanatory Report to art 3 para 3 and MüKo HGB, CIM, art 26, para 6  and art 27 para2 
(Freise).  
164 See CIM art 1.3, or unless it was trans-frontier carriage on (the few) registered lines in sea or waterway transport, CIM 
art 1.4. 
165 CMR art 1.1 and CMNI art 2.1. 
166 See CMR art 4. 
167 CMNI, art 2.1. 
168 CIM arts 45.2 and 26 with 1.3. 
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apply. He would therefore for the performance of an international road carriage only be liable if his 
personal liability could be established, yet in case he performed only a national road leg he could be 
faced with potential liability for the full contractual international rail transportation.169  
 
f) Substitute Carriers: 
CIM clarifies, that where the carrier is not a successive carrier, but a substitute rail carrier,170 he will 
not be liable for the full carriage of the goods,171 but only be liable under contract for the particular 
carriage undertaken with the difficulties of proof that the goods were indeed damaged or lost during 
his care. A substitute carrier is a rail carrier to whom the carrier has entrusted in whole or in part the 
performance of the carriage.172 The CIM liability rules are applicable to him and he is directly liable 
to the cargo claimant, even though no direct contract was concluded between them, facilitating 
compensation of the cargo claimant by inter alia limiting costs and risk of insolvency of the principal 
carrier.173  
 
In respect of the leg of carriage performed by him, the substitute rail carrier is liable jointly and 
severally with the carrier; although the latter remains liable for the whole contract in any event.174 
Recourse rights between the substitute carrier and the carrier are explicitly not prejudiced by the 
provision175 and fall outside the rules of recourse between successive carriers under arts 49 ff.176 
They are thus left to domestic law, such as the English Contribution Act, and any contract made 
between the carriers, including any potential application of CIM to such contracts.177 While the CMR 
does not have any such equivalent provision, such system is comparable to the actual and 
contractual carrier regimes in sea and air conventions.178 
 
 
4.4 Air carriage conventions: 
 
a) Successive Carrier Rules 
Both the Warsaw Convention system and the Montreal Convention provide for rules on successive 
carriage, setting out that each of the carriers who accepts passengers, luggage or goods is subjected 
to convention rules and is deemed to be a party to the contract, although, in contrast to the CMR 
and CIM, only to the extent that the contract is performed under his supervision.179 Thus liability is 
not incurred by a successive carrier for part of the carriage unrelated to him.  
 
Compared to the CMR and CIM, rights of suit against successive carriers, are also further restricted; 
in case of passenger claims to suit generally only against the carrier which performed the carriage 
                                                          
169 If the requirements CIM art 26 were fulfilled, although then also enabling him to possibly claim recourse according to 
CIM arts 50 ff. 
170 CIM art 27; a carrier who is not a rail carrier, but a road carrier for example is not a substitute carrier who can be sued 
directly, but an auxiliary according to art 40 (see Explanatory Report to CIM 1999, art 3 para 3. 
171  Under CIM art 49 ff. 
172 CIM art 27. 
173 See CIM arts 27.2, 27.4 and 45.6 and Explanatory Report to CIM 1999 art 45 para 4, art 27 para 1 and art 3 para 3 
adopting the institution on the “actual carrier” as known in air and sea transport. The provision essentially follows that of 
art 10 of the Hamburg Rules, making the substitute carrier directly liable under the CIM Rules. See also MüKo HGB, CIM, art 
27, paras 1 – 3 (Freise). 
174 CIM art 27.1 and 27.4  
175 CIM art 27.6. 
176 176 See CIM arts 49 ff and 3(a) for the definition of “carrier”, as opposed to „substitute carrier“, and MüKo HGB, CIM, Vor 
Art 49, para. 1 (Freise). 
177 In case the requirements were fulfilled, see CIM art 1.1 and 1.2 and requiring international carriage between CIM 
Member States. 
178 See for air carriage the Guadalajara Convention of 1962 applied under the Warsaw regime, and MC arts 39 – 48; for sea 
carriage the Hamburg Rules art 10 and the RR art 20 and inland waterways the CMNI art 4. 
179 WS art 30.1 and MC art 36.1. 
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during which the accident or the delay occurred.180 Claims for baggage or cargo, however, can be 
made against the last carrier, and further, against the carrier which performed the carriage during 
which the destruction, loss, damage or delay took place. These carriers will be jointly and severally 
liable to the passenger or to the consignor or consignee.181 
 
Application of the convention systems is achieved by looking at the overall carriage; if the parties 
regarded the carriage as a single operation, even if the carriage is performed by several successive 
carriers, whether part of a single contract or a series of contracts and it does not lose its 
international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed 
entirely within the territory of the same State.182 
 
The Montreal Convention and, where applicable in the form of the Montreal Additional Protocol No 
4, also the Warsaw Convention system183 clarify explicitly that recourse claims are not covered by 
the convention; these are thus left to domestic law.184 
 
b) Actual and contractual carriers 
Provision for actual carriers is found in the Montreal Convention and for the Warsaw Convention 
system is made by means of the supplementary Guadalajara Convention of 1961. Application of the 
conventions systems to and liability of actual carries is clarified insofar as they perform the carriage 
and that of contractual carriers for the whole of the carriage.185 Insofar as liability of actual and 
contractual carriers overlap the claimant can chose between suing the actual or contractual carrier 
or both, jointly or separately and carriers can make use of the rules of the lex fori to join the other 
carriers.186 Recourse actions between these carriers are explicitly not prejudiced by the 
conventions.187  
 
Thus whether for successive carriers, third parties or the actual contractual carrier relationship, 
recourse claims are outside the convention and thus governed by domestic law, including time limits 
for suit.188 And time limitation under the air carriage conventions is a very serious matter leading to 
a loss of the underlying right altogether.189 
 
c) Air convention time bars in context of the English Contribution Act 
Whereas the Carriage of Goods by Road Act needed not to include any time bar provision for 
recourse actions as this is already dealt with in the CMR Convention, a provision on extended time 
limitation for recourse claims under the air conventions had been made by the Carriage by Air Act 
1961 in its section 5.  
 
                                                          
180 WS art 30.2 and MC art 36.2, save in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the 
whole journey. 
181 WS art 30.3 and MC art 36.3. Although contrast CIM art 45.7, where the claimant may initially have a choice between 
several carriers, but can only sue one of them and by making the choice loses the right of action against all others. 
182 WS art 31.3 and MC art 1.3. 
183 The Warsaw Convention of 1929 as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955 and further amended by the Montreal 
Additional Protocol No 4 of 1975, The Warsaw-Hague-MP.4 Convention (WS-H-MP4). 
184 See Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Issue 142, September 2014, at paragraph 446.1, Chubb Insurance Company of 
Europe SA v Menlo Worldwide Forwarding Inc, 32 Avi 15, 978 (CD Cal, 2008) and South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [20]. 
And see discussion above n. 38-39. 
185 Guadalajara arts I - III and MC arts 39-41. 
186 Guadalajara art VII and MC art 45. 
187 Guadalajara art X and MC art 48. 
188 See also Chubb Insurance Company of Europe SA v Menlo Worldwide Forwarding Inc, 32 Avi 15, 978 (CD Cal, 2008), 
United Airlines v Sercel [2012] NSWCA 24, Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Issue 142, September 2014, at paragraph 
446.1 and South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [17-21]. 
189 See WS art 29 and MC art 35 and see South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [41] with reference to Elmar Giemulla, 
Ronald Schmid (ed.) Montreal Convention Commentary, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2006 Art 35 para 28 ff. 
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However section 5 had undergone several changes over time. Previously, section 5(2) had set a time 
bar for contribution claims to two years from the date of judgment against the carrier by air.190 In 
South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages Tomlinson LJ had explained that section 5(2) of the Carriage by 
Air Act simply clarified that the convention’s time limitation should not be read as applying to 
contribution claims.  The initial version of this sub-section had therefore provided for the 2 year time 
bar from judgment out of caution, since this matter was not covered by the air conventions.191 
However this part was repealed by the Limitation Act 1963, most likely in the light of section 4(4) of 
the 1963 Limitation Act stipulating likewise192 and in order to provide for time limitation for 
contribution in one general provision only. Yet still in the 1963 Act, section 4(4) clarified that the 
limitation rules for contribution rights arising from claims subject to the air convention would also be 
falling in the main contribution limitation rule of sub-sections (1-3), a clarification that would later 
fall away.193  
 
Section 4(1) of the 1963 Limitation Act initially referred to section 6 of the Law Reform (Married 
Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 which was later replaced by section 1 of the Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1978.194 However this new section 1(3) of the 1978 Act now also included that 
claims for contribution could generally be enforced even if time barred, although no longer where 
expiry of the limitation period meant an extinction of the right instead of a mere time bar. This was 
an amendment of the existing law on contribution which had developed inconsistently.  
 
Indeed, in the judgment of the House of Lords in George Wimpey & Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways 
Corp (BOAC)195, it had been held that a claimant could not recover contribution where the defendant 
had previously been sued by the creditor and had, by judgment been found not to be liable, even if 
the reason was ‘merely’ that the creditor’s action was statute-barred. This was held to be the 
consequence of section 6(1)(c) of the 1935 Act allowing contribution only from a “tortfeasor who … 
if sued would have been liable”. Yet, in the same case Lord Reid considered obiter196 that where no 
suit had taken place “if sued” might refer to the time at which the other tortfeaser (the contribution 
claimant) was sued.197 This more generous view was also preferred in a Scottish case on an 
equivalent issue under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940.198 An even 
                                                          
190 The original version of s 5(2) read: “Article 29 in the First Schedule of this Act shall not be read as applying to any 
proceedings for contribution between tortfeasors, but no action shall be brought by a tortfeasor to obtain a contribution 
from a carrier in respect of a tort to which the said Article 29 applies after the expiration of two years from the time when 
judgment is obtained against the person seeking to obtain the contribution.” 
191 SWSHA v BIV at [17]. 
192 Limitation Act 1963 s.4(1) and (4) under the heading “Time-limit for claiming contribution between tortfeasors”, read: 
“(1) Where under section 6 of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 a tortfeasor (in this section 
referred to as “the first tortfeasor”) becomes entitled after the passing of this Act to a right to recover contribution in 
respect of any damage from another tortfeasor, no action to recover contribution by virtue of that right shall (subject to 
subsection (3) of this section) be brought after the end of the period of two years from the date on which that right 
accrued to the first tortfeasor.” 
“(4) In relation to torts falling within Article 29 in Schedule 1 to the Carriage by Air Act 1961, the preceding subsections 
shall have effect in substitution for the limitation imposed by subsection (2) of section 5 of that Act; and accordingly in that 
subsection the words from “but no action” onwards are hereby repealed: 
Provided that this subsection shall not affect any action for a contribution where before the passing of this Act judgment 
has been obtained against the person seeking to obtain the contribution.” 
193 See Limitation Act 1980 s 10. 
194 See the consequential amendment in para 6 of Schedule 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. 
195 [1955] A.C. 169; [1954] 3 W.L.R. 932; HL. 
196 [1955] A.C. 169 at p. 190. 
197 He also considered favourably the view that it could mean, "if sued at some time" or "if sued at the time most 
favourable to the plaintiff", although he did not confirm these two suggestions and left it to a later decision.  
198 Dormer v Meville Dundas & Whitson Ltd 1990 SLT 186, 189 on s 3(2) of the 1940 Act, where it was also held that the 
creditor could not by his own action of suing the other tortfeasor late so as to destroy the contribution action of the 
claimant. The wording and content of the Scottish 1940 Act and the English 1935 Act were however sufficiently different so 
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broader view taken was that all that mattered was that the contribution defendant could have been 
sued in time in the past.199  
 
This uneasy relationship was abolished with the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 and limitation 
of the underlying claim is therefore no longer a defence against a contribution claim,200 unless this 
meant the extinction of the underlying right.201 Whether the effect of the extinction of rights on 
contribution rights resulting out of cargo movements within the conventions of the Carriage of Air 
Act was appreciated when making these amendments is questionable – at least no discussion 
thereof can be found in the preparatory documents of the Law Commission. Noteworthy in this 
context is, however, that the Limitation Acts, exceptionally, provide for the extinction of rights in 
certain circumstances. 202 Neither seems a later report on Limitation of Actions in 2001203 to shed 
light on this discussion. While it considered the effect of limitation, whether as a bar or as extinction 
of the right of action, and taking also into account the effect of extinction on contribution, it did not 
analyse the matters where extinction of action already curtailed contribution claims.  
 
The effect of the many changes to the contribution and limitation provisions is, it seems, that even 
claims for contribution arising from claims for liability for damage under the air conventions as 
implemented into legal systems of the UK by the Carriage by Air Act 1961 are subject to the time 
limitation rules under the convention.204  
 
This result may also seem to be in line with the case-law under the CMR where the CMR and its time 
bar is strictly applied between senders and carriers, even if all parties are carrier’s themselves. Yet, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that the difficulties of a judgment in favour of the other tortfeasor only by means of pleading limitation in the George 
Wimpey case did not emerge.  
199 Morgan v Ashmore Benson, Pease & Co [1953] 1 W.L.R. 418 at 420; Fortes Service Areas v Department of Transport of 
18th July 1984, 1984 WL 988591, CA per Browne-Wilkinson LJ (and agreed by Dunn LJ): “To my mind the words in their plain 
meaning mean ‘if sued at any time’ ; that is to say, if it is possible to point to any time at which an action by the plaintiff 
against the third party would have succeeded, that is enough to satisfy the requirements of the section.”. 
200 S 1(3) of the Contribution Act and see Law Commission Report, Law Com No 79 paras 25, 60 and 81(g), Working Paper 
no 59, paras 31-35 and Mitchell para 12.32. See also RA Lister & Co Ltd v EG Thomson (Shipping) Ltd (No.2) [1987] 1 W.L.R. 
1614, at 1621 and 1623, QBD; Nottingham HA v Nottingham City Council [1988] 1 W.L.R. 903 at 906 and 912; CA and 
Societe Commerciale De Reassurance v Eras (International) Limited (formerly Eras (U.K.)) and Others (The Eras Eil Actions) 
[1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 570 at 601, CA. 
201 See also, without further discussion, Halsbury’s Laws of England/Carriage and Carriers (Vol 7 (2015), Carriage by Air, 
International Carriage, para 165. 
202 See e.g. Limitation Act 1980, s 3(2) for the owner’s title to a chattel which is extinguished after 6 years after its 
conversion and s 11A (3), where the tort victim’s right to sue for damage caused by a defective product is extinguished 
after 10 years from the relevant time. In both cases there is an interest for finality. 
203 Law Com No 270 (2001) (HC 23) para 5.21: “In the Consultation Paper we provisionally proposed that no change should 
be made to the general rule that the expiry of the limitation period should merely bar the remedy. We explained that we 
could see no advantages in changing the present position, and that making ‘extinction’ the general rule could create 
difficulties, most notably in contribution cases. [FN: Limitation of Actions, Consultation Paper No 151 (1998), para 14.21.] 
Nor did we think that it would be practicable to change the position in relation to the exceptional cases where the 
limitation period extinguishes the right, so that a uniform rule of barring the remedy could be applied. In land-related 
claims and conversion, such a reform would undermine the claimant’s title acquired on the expiry of the relevant limitation 
period. The position relating to the expiry of the ‘long-stop’ period under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 is governed by 
European law and is consequently outside the remit of this Paper.” And see Limitation of Actions, Consultation Paper No 
151 (1998), para 14.21: “…Moreover, we feel that making “extinction” the general rule could create difficulties (notably in 
the case of actions for a contribution, where the limitation period for an action by the plaintiff in the original action against 
the defendant to the contribution action may have expired before the right to bring a contribution action has accrued). Our 
provisional view is that … no change should be made to the present law on the effect of the expiry of a limitation period...” 
204 By reason of the Contribution Act s 1(3). Yet, a solution to exactly marry the limitation of the contribution claim with 
that of the main claim was seen as unsatisfactory by the Law Commission in their Working Paper No 59 “Contribution” at 
para 35, but a closing of the time gap as much as possible to force a timely contribution claim was suggested as a potential 
solution and comments were invited on it. This suggestion reminds, for example, of the solutions found in the sea carriage 
conventions where indemnity claims against third parties are allowed at least for a further 3 months (HVR art III r6bis) or 
90 days (HambR, art 20.4, RR art 64, CMNI art 24.4), failing any more flexible provision of the relevant lex fori.  
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exceptionally, also under the CMR, recourse actions between carriers classed as successive carriers, 
benefit from a longer period.205 Indeed, this additional period seems to have been a motivating 
factor in some jurisdictions for a wide interpretation of the notion of successive carriers the 
successive carrier regime in order to cover a wider range of carriers and bring their interactions into 
the extended time bar of section 39.4 CMR for recourse actions.206   
 
In contrast, one may see in the provision in section 1(3) of the Contribution Act 1978 without 
reintroduction of a further stipulation in the Carriage by Air Act an intentional clarification that any 
extinction of rights under the air conventions is final, whether such a right of action was exercised by 
cargo or by other carriers for contribution or recourse. After all, the air conventions are strict and 
cannot be contracted out of,207 thus, one may argue, clearly showing the mandatory nature of the 
convention rules. This interpretation might, however, be going beyond what was intended to be 
covered by the air conventions:  
 
The Montreal Convention in articles 29 and 30 set out the convention’s priority for claims only for 
damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger, destruction or loss of, or of 
damage to checked baggage or of cargo.208 However, contribution claims are specifically left 
untouched by the convention and a contribution claim is not a claim for damages due to such loss 
based on a carrier’s liability for damage, but based on a right of recourse209 to share in the cost of 
the loss. This is what the Montreal Convention in contrast to the earlier Warsaw Convention210 
clarified in its article 37211 (and also in article 48 for the relationship between actual and contractual 
carriers),212 that the convention only regulates the relationships between passenger, consignor and 
consignee towards the air carrier and vice versa. Third parties however are not included.213 Indeed 
the stipulation in section 5 (2) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961214 seems to be based on the 
assumption that contribution claims are not covered by the conventions,215 otherwise the Act would 
be in breach of the convention rules and therefore the obligations of the UK under international 
law216 to give effect to them.  
 
Therefore, one may instead see the various changes in the Carriage by Air Act 1961 and Limitation 
Acts as an oversight of legislation due to the parallel reforms and consolidation of the Limitation Acts 
culminating in the Limitation Act 1980 alongside the development of the law of contribution from 
section 6 of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 to the Civil Liability 
                                                          
205 CMR art 39.4 with 32. 
206 Although this approach has been criticised as going beyond the legal framework of the CMR; see above n.90.  
207 According to WC art 32 and MC art 49, a clause infringing the provisions of the convention is null and void. 
208 Elmar Giemulla, Ronald Schmid (ed.) Montreal Convention Commentary, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2006 at 
Introduction, para 43. 
209 See South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages at [20] referring to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Chubb 
Insurance Company of Europe SA v Menlo Worldwide Forwarding Inc, 32 Avi 15, 978 (CD Cal, 2008), followed in Allianz 
Global Corporate & Speciality v EMO Trans California Inc 34 Avi 15,274 (ND Cal, 2010) the relevant entry in Shawcross and 
Beaumont, Air Law, Issue 142, September 2014, at paragraph 446.1, further referring to a Canadian decision in Connaught 
Laboratories Ltd v Air Canada, as well as the New South Wales Court of Appeal in United Airlines v Sercel [2012] NSWCA 24 
all affirming the decision in Chubb. See also Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Issue 145, June 2015, at paras 413, 446.1 
and 463, 464 – 500, showing also that there are opinions to the contrary, and e.g. the French Court de Cassation in Eureka 
Logistique v UPS (court de cass, 20 Oct 2009) (2009) 63 RFDA 435 applied the 2 year limitation period also to recourse 
actions. 
210  But see the inclusion in art 30A in the Warsaw –Hague Convention in its version as amended by the Montreal Protocol 
No 4.  
211 See Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Issue 145, June 2015, at paras 463, 464 – 500. 
212 The latter provision has its correlation in Art X of the Guadalajara Convention for the Warsaw regime. 
213 MüKo HGB-Ruhwedel, MÜ, art 37 para 2-3 and art 36 para 27 and South West SHA v Bay Island Voyages [20]. 
214 Clarifying the convention’s limitation provisions do not apply to contribution claims. 
215 Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Issue 145, June 2015, at para 446.1. 
216 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), arts 26 – 29. 
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(Contribution) Act 1978.217 The amendments to the 1963 Limitation Act and consolidation into the 
1980 Limitation Act might have simply been premised on the assumption that contribution arising 
from claims under the Carriage by Air Act fell within the same regime as the then section 6 of the 
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935. It might also have been assumed that with 
section 5 of the Carriage by Air Act being repealed, limitation was brought all in line with the general 
rule and it might have been forgotten that the air conventions provide the extinction of the right at 
the point of limitation. However whether or not the disapplication of the convention rules on 
limitation in section 5(2) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961 with the suggested underlying intention as 
set out above is indeed sufficient to circumvent the explicit rule in section 1(3) of the Contribution 
Act will have to be tested in court. 
 
 
4.5 Conventions on sea carriage and inland waterways 
 
Sea and inland waterway carriage conventions have no specific system for successive carriers but 
most of these conventions systems, with the notable absence of the Hague and Hague Visby Rules, 
contain provisions on the liability of the actual carrier under the convention, the joint and several 
liability of the actual and contractual carriers, and cargo’s rights of suit against either or both of 
them.218 They also, as is the case in the Hague Visby Rules,219 provide for an extended time bar for 
recourse claims: generally reference is made to the lex fori, but a minimum time beyond that of the 
underlying claim for damage under the conventions of 3 months or 90 days is provided.220 Otherwise 
they seem to leave recourse actions to domestic law and this is explicitly pointed out in the Hamburg 
Rules.221  
 
 
5. Effect of time bar provision  
 
In the context of section 1(3) of the English Contribution Act it is noteworthy that the sea and 
waterway conventions, with the exception of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules,222 are all worded as 
time bars although the Rotterdam Rules explicitly allow reliance on the time barred rights to 
counterclaim and set –off, whereas the CMNI explicitly rejects such possibility.223 Therefore no issues 
ought to arise here; as for the Hague-Visby Rules, it is submitted that its provision of article III rule 
6bis must be applied as having priority over section 1(3) of the Contribution Act. Thus while under 
English law a 2 year time bar for contribution claims would generally apply, it seems that the effect 
of section 1(3) of the Contribution Act would be that while recourse claims under the Hague-Visby 
Rules would remain possible after “the discharge” of the underlying right, they would have to be 
brought no later than within 3 months from settlement or service of the claim form against the 
contribution claimant.  
 
                                                          
217 See Law Com No. 79 para 32. 
218 See HambR art 10, RR arts 19 and 20, CMNI art 4. 
219 Albeit not the Hague Rules.  
220 See HVR art III r6 bis, HambR art 20.4, RR art 64 and CMNI art 24.4. 
221 See HambR art 10.6 but contrast the CMNI which provides explicitly for the application of the convention rules between 
the contractual and the actual carrier, thus limiting the freedom to contract on other terms (CMNI art 4.1 and 25). 
222 See Aries Tanker Corporation v Total Transport Limited [1977] 1 WLR 185 (see in particular Lord Wilberforce at 188) and 
also Henriksens Rederi A/S v Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego (CHZ) Rolimpex (The Brede) [1974] QB 233, where is was held 
that cargo damage could not be relied on as defence or set-off or against freight claims and was extinguished after the 
time lapse; cf. Goulandris Brothers Ltd v B Goldman & Sons Ltd [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 207 Pearson J for a contribution claim 
under the York-Antwerp Rules.  
223 See RR art 62.3 and contrast CMNI art 20.5; no such provision is found in HambR art 20, seemingly leaving the matter to 
domestic law. 
Book Chapter 
25 
 
In both the CMR and CIM limitation of time for suit is regulated with some detail, although both 
leave some matters regarding extension of the period of limitation or of some suspension and 
interruption issues to national law.224 Although the conventions clarify that the right of action 
enshrined in them cannot be exercised by way of counterclaim or set off once limitation has 
occurred,225 the provisions on limitation of time for suit are understood as a mere bar to the remedy, 
rather than as extinction of the right.226 Indeed, CIM in its preceding article to the limitation of action 
prescribes the extinction of the right of action on acceptance of the goods without ascertainment of 
any loss or damage,227 and thus shows by this distinction that limitation is not a matter of extinction 
of the right itself. This would be of importance if any recourse claims would be made under the 
Contribution Act, insofar as the Act would not be dis-applied in favour of the specific CIM convention 
recourse rules. 
 
However where goods are carried by air under an applicable air carriage convention, the cargo claim 
is extinguished altogether by lapse of time.228 As discussed above229 this is likely to lead to the 
conclusion that due to the disconnect between the relevant section of the Carriage by Air Act 1961 
and the Contribution Act, this means that a contribution claim based on such an extinguished cargo 
claim can equally be no longer made. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It is seen from the discussion on recourse rights that the interaction of domestic law with the 
conventions provisions can be challenging and that the piece-meal incorporation of conventions or 
amendments to implementing legislation without full regard of all the implications can prove to be 
hazardous to parties seeking recourse. Even if one system is understood, the next convention system 
seems to operate and interact with the English domestic contribution provisions in a different 
manner again. Time limitation for recourse actions thus stretch from no additional time to the 
underlying claim for damage in case of the air conventions, the CMR – insofar as recourse is outside 
its successive carrier rules - and the Hague Rules, to three months in case of the Hague Visby Rules, 
one year in CMR successive carrier relationships,230 two years in other sea conventions231 and to two 
or six years in case of CIM.232 
 
While many of the multimodal forms or freight forwarder’s standard conditions provide for a nine 
months’ time bar233 allowing the principal contractor a leeway of at last three months for recourse 
actions, this will only help a carrier seeking recourse so long as the cargo claimant cannot insist on 
the longer time bar under a mandatorily applicable transport convention.234  
                                                          
224 See CMR art 32.3 and CIM, art 48.5. 
225 See CMR art 32.4 and CIM, art 48.4. 
226 See Clarke para 43, CIM art 48 in contrast to art 47 and MüKo HGB, CMR, art 32 para 48 (Jesser-Huß).  
227 See CIM art 47. 
228 See Montreal Convention, art 35.1 and Warsaw Convention, art 25. 
229 See 4.4 c). 
230 Unless wilful misconduct introduces a 3 year period. 
231 Due to the application of the Contribution Act with its special time bar in s 10 of the Limitation Act 1980. 
232 Depending on whether the claim is seen as falling within the Contribution Act or instead under the CIM convention 
rules. 
233 See BIMCO’s (The Baltic and International Maritime Council) COMBICON (Combined Transport Bill of Lading), revision 
1995, cl 4,  BIMCO’s MULTIDOC (Multimodal Transport Bill of Lading), revision 1995, cl 4; FIATA’s (International Federation 
of Freight Forwarders Associations) multimodal transport bill of lading form, cl 17; FIATA Model Rules for Freight 
Forwarding Services 2007, cl 10; UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents (ICC Publication No. 481), cl 10; 
BIFA STC (British International Freight Association Standard Trading Conditions), 2005A, cl 27 (B). cf. the one year time bar 
of NSAB (Nordic Association of Freight Forwarders ) 2000 General Conditions, § 30. 
234 Where damage is localised and the forum treats the relevant transport convention as mandatorily applicable, 
irrespective of the multimodal nature of the contract; see for example the English case of Quantum Corporation Inc v Plane 
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Overall, conventions must be implemented appropriately and in case of clashes with domestic law, 
convention rules must be given priority. This principle, while giving a guideline, does not necessarily 
give clarity to the parties of a contribution claim. Thus any uncertainty in the law is complicating 
recourse for parties, even more so where there are likely several uncertainties due to the use of 
different transport methods. Therefore the disparate systems compounded by disparate 
implementation makes the use of true transport intermodality an even riskier business. 
 
From an English law perspective it is recommended that, at least, the current uncertainty as to the 
interaction between COTIF-CIM235 and the Contribution Act and the Warsaw and Montreal 
Conventions with the Contribution Act are removed. 
 
It is thus recommended that the Railways (Convention on International Carriage by Rail) Regulations 
2005 (COTIF Regulations) be amended to disapply the Contribution Act insofar as the COTIF-CIM 
Convention applies. Wording similar to that of the Rail Passengers’ Rights and Obligations 
Regulations 2010 could be used for this purpose. However, in addition, the position on limitation of 
recourse actions should be clarified. After disapplication of the Contribution Act limitation would be 
six years. It is submitted that this is inappropriately long in the field of carriage where Convention 
limitation is only one year, with the exceptional grounds providing for two years.236 The two-year 
solution from judgment of payment of the underlying claim, as in section 10 of the Limitation Act 
1980, would seem more appropriate, but application of this provision would have to be clarified due 
to the provision’s very limited scope, or a similar provision would have to be added to the 2005 
COTIF Regulation. Incidentally such provision stipulating the time for limitation is also missing in the 
Rail Passengers’ Rights and Obligations Regulations 2010, implementing the EU Passenger Rights 
Regulation. It is submitted that limitation should be aligned with the position chosen to apply under 
the COTIF Regulation, so as to avoid different timeframes for contribution claimed resulting from the 
carriage of passengers under CIV, depending on whether carriage takes place within or outside the 
EU.237 
 
Equally section 5(2) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961 should be amended to re-introduce its initial 
version, setting a time bar for contribution actions arising out of air conventions’ damages claims at 
2 years from judgment or payment of the underlying claim. Additionally, to ensure its effectiveness, 
a further provision should be added insofar to dis-apply section 1(3) of the Contribution Act. If, 
however this was not be seen as an acceptable solution and that for policy reasons priority should 
be given to the finality of extinction provisions of the underlying claims, then sections 5(2) and (4) 
should be deleted, in order so as not to cause confusion. 
 
Whether an alignment to a 2-year contribution time frame for other non-mandatory contribution 
regimes, such as that of the HVR is appropriate should also be considered. If the amendments as 
above were included, it is submitted, that such an alignment would be a positive step in unifying a 
disparate and haphazard system. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Trucking [2002] EWCA Civ 350, [2002] 1 WLR 2678 for a mandatory application of the CMR to the international road leg of 
a multimodal contract under an air waybill. 
235 And also COTIF –CIV. 
236 And 3 years for claims for death or personal injury to passengers.  
237 The EU Regulation having priority over COTIF, see Art 2 of the Agreement Between The Intergovernmental Organisation 
For International Carriage By Rail And The European Union On The Accession Of The European Union To The Convention 
Concerning International Carriage By Rail (COTIF) Of 9 May 1980, As Amended By The Vilnius Protocol Of 3 June 1999 of 
23rd June 2011. 
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Convention 
or system 
Successive carrier  
(SC) rules/ 
(Contractual and 
actual carrier) 
Liability rules 
inter se 
Rules on time 
bar for 
indemnity or 
contribution 
Who can be sued 
by cargo and 
when?  
Who can be sued 
for recourse by 
other carriers 
and when? 
CMR 
arts 34 - 40 
Strict SC rules– all 
carriers carrying 
under same 
contract and by 
taking over the 
consignment note 
liable for complete 
transit (34) 
Carrier or carriers 
liable according to 
causality – 
otherwise 
according to  
share of carriage 
charge; all carriers 
cover for 
insolvent carrier 
(37 – 38) 
Suit to be 
commenced 
within one year 
from judgment or 
date of payment 
by carrier seeking 
recourse (39.4) 
First, last and 
carrier in whose 
care event giving 
rise to damage 
occurred (36) 
All carriers in one 
forum at place of 
business of one 
of the SCs (39);  
No requirement 
to sue all;  
No prohibition 
of joinder of 
actions  
CIM 
arts 26, 45, 
50-52 
art 27, 45.6 
Strict SC rules -  all 
carriers carrying 
under same 
contract and by 
taking over the 
consignment note 
liable for complete 
transit (26); 
 
Rules also for 
substitute carriage 
(joint and several 
liability)  (27) 
Carrier or carriers 
liable according to 
causality – 
otherwise 
according to  
share of carriage 
charge;  all 
carriers cover for 
insolvent carrier  
(50) 
N/A 
No time period 
stipulated –  
left to domestic 
law 
Only first or last or 
carrier in whose 
care event giving 
rise to proceed’s 
(45.1); choice of 
defendant carr. 
extinguishes right 
to choose (45.7) – 
no joinder of  
actions; 
Alternatively, suit  
possible also 
against substitute 
carrier (45.6) 
Recourse claim 
must be made 
against all SC in 
same proceed’s – 
or claim is lost 
(51.2);  
Jurisdiction of 
court at place of 
business of one 
of the SCs (51.4);  
Joinder of 
recourse to cargo 
proceed’s NOT 
possible (51.6) 
WS 1929 
art 30 (and 
Guadalajara 
Conv. 1961) 
WS-H-MP4 
arts30 &30A 
 
SC Rules –all 
carriers part of 
contract to extent 
of their part of 
carriage; liable gen. 
only for own part of 
carriage, but  
jointly & severally 
liable for goods 
(30);  
 
And actual carrier 
rules in Guadalaja-
ra Conv. 1961 (GC) 
Domestic law: 
Recourse rights 
betw. SCs not 
covered by Convs; 
left to domestic 
law; (30A WS-H-
MP4) 
Rights of recourse 
betw. actual & 
contractual 
carriers explicitly 
not prejudiced by 
Guadalajara Conv; 
(X GC)  
N/A 
No time period 
stipulated –  
left to domestic 
law 
Cargo claims: 
consignor against 
first carrier; 
consignee against 
last carrier and all 
against carrier in 
whose charge loss 
occurred (30.3); 
 
Contr. or actual 
carrier or both (VII 
GC) 
Right to join 
other carrier as 
per lex fori  (VII 
GC); 
MC  
arts 36- 37, 
arts 39 - 48 
SC Rules - all 
carriers part of 
contract to extent 
of their part of 
carriage; liable gen. 
only for own part of 
carriage, but jointly 
& severally liable 
for goods (36); 
 
AND actual carrier 
rules (39 – 48) 
Domestic law: 
Rights of recourse 
explicitly not 
prejudiced by MC 
(whether third 
parties, successive 
carriers or  
actual/contractual 
carriers; 37 & 48) 
N/A 
No time period 
stipulated –  
left to domestic 
law 
Cargo claims: 
consignor against 
first carrier; 
consignee against 
last carrier and all 
against carrier in 
whose charge loss 
occurred (36.3); 
 
Contr. or actual 
carrier or both (45) 
Right to join 
other carrier as 
per lex fori (45); 
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HR N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
HVR 
art.III r.6 bis  
N/A N/A Time for 
commencing suit 
per lex fori, but no 
less than least 3 
months from 
settlement by or 
service of claim 
against the carrier 
seeking indemnity 
(III r.6bis) 
N/A N/A 
Hamburg 
Rules 
arts 10 & 11, 
20.4 
Joint and several 
liability of  
contr. and actual 
carrier (10.4), 
unless through 
carr. 
Rights of recourse 
betw. carriers 
explicity 
unaffected (10.6) 
Time for 
commencing suit 
per lex fori, but no 
less than 90 days 
from settlement 
by or service of 
claim against the 
carrier seeking 
indemnity (20.4) 
N/A N/A 
RR 
Arts 19 & 20, 
64 
Joint and several 
liability of  
contr. carrier and 
maritime perf. 
party (20) 
N/A Time for 
commencing suit 
per lex fori, but no 
less than 90 days 
from settlement 
by or service of 
claim against the 
carrier seeking 
indemnity (64) 
N/A N/A 
CMNI 
arts 4, 24.4 
Joint and several 
liability of contr. 
and actual carrier 
(4.5) 
Rights of recourse 
betw. carriers 
expl. unaffected 
(4.5); 
 
Conv. liability 
rules also apply 
betw. contr. and 
actual carrier (4.1) 
Time for 
commencing suit 
per lex fori, but no 
less than 90 days 
from settlement 
by or service of 
claim against the 
carrier seeking 
indemnity (24.4) 
N/A N/A 
 
Table 2: comparison of conventions in their regulation of successive carriers and/or of actual & 
contractual carriers. 
 
